Egypt and Tunisia: Testing Grounds for Goldstone's Assertions on the Revolutionary Process

Mısır ve Tunus: Devrime Giden Süreçte Goldstone'un İddialarına Yönelik Deneme Alanları

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Abstract

The revolutionary process in Tunisia and Egypt highlights new actors, modes of expression, and loose networking. The protests were called and organized by ordinary citizens connected through social networking sites. Nevertheless, the older media such as TV and mobile phone were equally significant. The culture of societies had been significantly transformed in recent years. Once the protests began, they snowballed as thousands of people joined in. The mere numbers shook the regimes as the armed forces refused to take sides with the regime, leaving no option for the authoritarian rulers but to step down.

Key Words: Revolution, process, Goldstone, Tunisia, Egypt, networking, culture.

Öz

Tunus ve Mısır'daki devrime giden süreçler yeni aktörleri, ifade biçimlerini ve etki alanı genişleyen sosyal ağları ön plana çıkarmıştır. Protestolar sosyal medya üzerinden örgütlenen sıradan

vatandaşlar tarafından düzenlenmiştir. Bunların yanı sıra geleneksel iletişim araçları olan TV ve cep telefonları da bu süreçte etkin rol oynamıştır. Son yıllarda toplumların kültür hayatında büyük oranda değişiklikler meydana gelmiştir. Protesto gösterileri başlamasının ardından çığ gibi büyümüş ve binlerce insan bu gösterilere katılmıştır. Ordular rejim yanlısı bir tutum sergilememiş ve sade vatandaşların eylemleri rejimleri sarsmış ve sonuçta otoriter yöneticilere görevden çekilmekten başka bir seçenek kalmamıştır.

***Anahtar Kelimeler:** Devrim, süreç, Goldstone, Tunus, Mısır, sosyal medya, kültür.*

Introduction

The authoritarian regimes of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt considered so impervious to change were brought down with much ease and stunning speed in early 2011. The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions were unpredictable because they came in a new fashion -new modes of political activity, new networks evading physical space initially and later on through joint action of people in large scale protests and demonstrations. The revolutionaries were striving for a number of diffused ideals. In a few years prior to the revolutions, the local culture had transformed significantly through increased connectivity with the global world.

The study will apply the theoretical framework of the fourth generation of revolutionary theory to examine the revolutionary process in Tunisia and Egypt. The study restricts itself to the way revolutions came only; it will neither look into the causes nor the outcomes. In the process, theory is also put to test; whether it is useful or not in explaining the phenomenon. If theory is unable to explain the phenomenon, the lacunae are pointed out which can be explored further by other scholars.

The paper is divided into three parts: The first part briefly captures Goldstone's theory on revolutionary process. The second part narrates the events of the revolution as they took place.

The third part analyses the events in light of the revolutionary theory of Goldstone.

Goldstone on Revolutionary Process

Jack A. Goldstone, a key theorist among the fourth generation of revolutionary theorists, differed with the previous generation of theorists on many grounds. Earlier, revolution was explained in structuralist paradigm by the third generation. While appreciating their strength, theorists called for filling in the voids left by them. The shortcomings in work produced by earlier theorists were highlighted during the revolutions of the 1980's and the 1990's. Goldstone pointed out that multi-class coalitions were instrumental in overthrowing the regimes in Iran, Nicaragua and Philippines. Still in others, ideology played a role as in Iran and in Afghanistan. In East European states and Soviet Union, mass protests and strikes were the hallmark of revolutionary process. The structuralist paradigm was unable to explain these revolutions.

Goldstone defines revolution as "an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and non-institutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities."[1]

More appreciably, the fourth generation theorists elaborated the revolutionary process that has hitherto been overlooked by earlier theorists. They stressed that these concepts must be integrated into the existing theory to explain sociology of revolutions.

A revolution is shaped by the process: how revolution unfolds, what actors are involved, how do these actors come together, what are their goals etc. According to Goldstone, a number of factors are involved in the revolutionary process: creation and adoption of revolutionary identity; mobilization through networks; culture and ideology; leadership; and the unfolding of revolutionary

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[1] Jack A. Goldstone, "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory", *Annual Review of Political Science* 2001, Vol: 4, 139-187, p. 142.

process itself. His theory on the revolutionary process is being briefly discussed here.

Revolutionary identity is not created easily. Actors adopt the identities of protest group and start identifying themselves with broader causes. People associate themselves with certain groups along with their grievances as well as the practical remedial measures.

The actors are mobilized through networks. Earlier formal organizations were considered essential to mobilize people. But the effective role played by informal organizations in the East European Revolutions of 1989-1990, was widely acknowledged in bringing people together and putting up resistance to state.

The state is considered unjust, inefficient and highly repressive. This perception about state is shaped within the context of existing cultural frameworks and also with the help of carefully constructed ideologies.

Cultural frameworks are moulded through prevalent assumptions, values and symbols. There is no common cultural framework but various frameworks existing side by side. Ideology, on the other hand, is deliberately created to ensure uniformity of ideas, propagated towards a bigger goal or course of action. Ideologies provide a momentum to revolution. Ideology, however, is no guarantee for success of a revolution and a lot depends upon the actions of the state and skills of revolutionary leaders.[2]

Revolutionary history is replete with revolutionary leaders. The leadership skills are critical for a revolution. Successful leaders take advantage of suitable timings and favourable political and economic circumstances. The leadership skills are also required for the post-revolutionary period such as internecine struggles and military challenges. Only when the revolutionary leaders are able to overcome these challenges the pre-revolutionary goals are achieved.

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[2] Ibid., p. 156.

There is no set pattern of a revolutionary process to unfold. It may take various forms and is dependent on actions and reactions of regimes, regime opposition, counter-revolutionary movements, and the general public. How these social movements blow into revolutions is dependent upon response of regimes, elites and people. Sometimes repression by the regime can actually speed up opposition. At other times, regimes are able to crush large scale mobilization. Sometimes repression by the regime can actually speed up opposition. At other times, regimes are able to crush large scale mobilization. The regime has to be very cautious in selecting the right "combination of concessions and repressions"[3] to contain the opposition.

With the coming of recent revolutions in Arab World, the revolutionary theory as put forth by forth generation theorists particularly Goldstone needs to be tested. It may validate or refute the assertions of theory. While putting the revolutionary theory to test, the revolutionary theory may be given a new direction that will make significant contribution to the revolutionary discourse.

Revolutionary Process

The Spark

The trigger in each case was different. In Tunisia, it was the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi. Every Tunisian could relate to Bouazizi, his hardships and desperation. He was a sole earner for a large family. His fruit cart was overturned, his scale confiscated and publically humiliated. He tried to reach the Governor with a threat of alighting himself but faced disappointment. Some passers-by made the video of his self-immolation that was posted on YouTube. Without the video and new technologies, the news would not even have left the town of Sidi Bouzid and the world would have never found out about it.

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[3] Ibid., p. 161.

The spark to Egyptian revolution came from the Tunisian revolution. The sight of thousands of people pouring into the streets and opposing the Ben Ali regime and succeeding in toppling him inspired the Egyptians and they followed suit. In Egypt, the spread of word of death of Khaled Said provided the impetus. Though Khaled Said had died many months ago but the news was publicized through Facebook. Another trigger came from the Wikileaks. The tales of corruption unfolded to a population connected to the internet; the Wikileaks were also given coverage by Al Jazeera.

Due to growing opposition against the regime and large strength of the people in the protests, the public found the strength to stand up to the regime. Their resolve was strengthened by the rumours and news, and reinforced by the newly launched repression of the regimes. "Revolutions are the locus of distorted events and exaggerated facts, unilateral views giving birth to rumours and fears."[4] In Tunisia's case the self immolation of Bouazizi and the rumours related to it brought the people to the streets.[5] In Egypt, Mubarak fortune placed at seventy billion dollars also radicalized the people who cared less whether it was true.[6] In the heat of the revolutionary mood people took the rumours as facts.

Unfolding of Revolutionary Process

On December 17th, 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi who had set himself ablaze was brought to hospital by a number of teachers. But Bouzizi died of his burns on January 4th, 2011. The family of Bouazizi and trade unionists marched; riots erupted; protestors particularly the youth threw stones at police. The protests then spread to other towns. Another suicide on December 22nd added

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[4] Farhad Khosrokhavar, "The New Arab Revolutions that shook the World", *Paradigm*, Boulder, 2012, p.38.
[5] One such rumor was that Bouazizi was slapped by a policewoman. Later on, it was revealed that the policewoman neither insulted him nor beat him.
[6] Farhad Khosrokhavar, "The New Arab Revolutions that shook the World", *Paradigm,* Boulder, 2012, p. 38.

fuel to the fire. The Ben Ali regime launched repressive measures killing two people in a shooting spree by police.

On December 24th, lawyers protested in town of Kasserine in close collaboration with the youth. For a while, the Lawyers' National Council assumed the leadership of the movement and organized demonstrations in many towns and cities on December 31st. The lawyers went on strike on January 6th; by this time many more towns had joined the movement. People also attacked government buildings and set them alight. By January 8th, the regime had intensified repression; dozens of people were killed by sniper shootings. The security forces were replaced with army on January 10th, a move that was welcomed by the people.

The revolution was fortified when Tunisian General Labour Union *Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail* (UGTT) joined it. The secondary education section organized a 20 minute strike in school to show solidarity with the protestors. The national section joined the regional sections much later. The trade union declared a strike on January 12th in Sfax. The demonstration on that day was the largest, comprising of thirty thousand people. The demonstrators called for the regime to step down. On January 14th, UGTT had given a call for national strike. That day, Ben Ali stepped down.

In Egypt, January 25th was chosen to begin protests. The day is known as National Police Day, a commemoration of the day when Egyptian police rose up and fought British military force in 1952 in Suez Canal town of Ismailiyya. Egyptians call this 'Day of Rage'. Thousands of people came out in many cities across Egypt particularly in Cairo. Police tried to disperse the protestors and there were many incidents of clashes between protestors and police resulting in injuries of thousands and arrest of hundreds of protestors.

Mubarak regime closed down Facebook, Twitter and Blackberry services. A new wave of protests was seen on January 28th after the Friday prayers. Lawyers joined in many places. As a result, Mubarak sacked the cabinet and appointed a vice president from an undisclosed place. The biggest number of people gathered

in Cairo's Tahrir Square; they camped down there and refused to leave the ground. These protestors belonged to various age groups and political affinities. Clashes also erupted between anti-Mubarak and pro-Mubarak groups. The army was also called in. The number of protestors in Tahrir Square reached to a million in a few days.

By February 9th, 2011, labour union joined the protestors and strikes were observed throughout the country. On February 10th, Mubarak announced that he would not stand in next elections that were to be held in September that year. Protestors became furious at this announcement. By the next day, Mubarak had resigned.

Effendi believes that people attained freedom when they found the courage to demand freedom and remained steadfast in face of thousands of policemen. Freedom was also found when people knew they had "tasted the power of coordinated public action." Freedom was attained in the public squares, Tahrir square and Bourguiba Avenue.[7]

Protests were mostly peaceful. Violence was a result of regime crackdown or in some places regimes supporters attacked the peaceful protestors such as the camel attacks in February 2011.

Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain divide the digital revolution, as they would like to term it, into five phases. The first is 'Preparation Phase' in which activists came into contact with each other through digital media, shared their grievances and set common goals. In the second 'Ignition Phase' an event infuriated the activists; and one critical incident acted as a catalyst and sparked the fire. In Tunisian case, it was the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi and in Egyptian case, it was the torture and murder of Khaled Said in 2010 which led to formation of a Facebook group called '*Kulena Khaled Said*' (We are all Khaled Said).

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[7] Abdelwahab El Affendi, "Constituting liberty, Healing the Nation: revolutionary identity creation in the Arab World's delayed 1989", ***Third World Quarterly***, 2011, Vol: 32, No. 7, 1255-1271, p. 1267.

In third phase of 'Street Protests' protests were coordinated by online networking. The 'International Buy-in Phase', the fourth one, the images of protests were noticed by foreign media and governments, international organizations and diasporas. In the fifth phase of 'Climax' governments tried to quell the protests through concession and repression and different outcomes are seen in various countries.[8]

Another concept explaining the phenomenon is the 'contagion effect'. The events were driven by 'contagion'. "Contagion refers to the epidemic-like spread of demonstrations and disturbances that eludes any intentional efforts by the regimes to control their intensity, scope or direction."[9] Contagion is a way of learning. In the early phase of the revolution, learning took place through channels of information. However, the real contagion effect started after that. The contagion effect is not about cognitive and conscious learning but more about emotions and buzz. The buzz did the trick as it allured the people into joining the protest groups and adopting the collective identity. Hence, in Tunisia and Egypt the contagion effect made the people turned out in streets and squares. The sight of people in Tahrir Square motivated the people. The contagion also produced new interpretative frames such as Mubarak regimes' unacceptability. These interpretative frameworks defined the new political behavior of the masses.

Reaction of the Regime

In response to the protests, Ben Ali regime launched repressive measures resulting in killings of people. Protestors were arrested by the police. To disperse protestors, police ransacked buildings and set fire to vehicles. In order to cut the umbilical cord

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[8] Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, "The Role of Digital Media", *Journal of Democracy,* 2011, Vol: 22, No. 3, 35-48, pp. 41, 42.
[9] Timo Behr and Mika Aaltola, "The Arab Uprising Causes, Prospects and Implications", **FIIA Briefing Paper** 76, March 2011, www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/bp76.pdf (Access date: September 2012)

of online activism, the regime tried to get hold of internet users' passwords and censor online criticism against the regime.

Some appeasement measures were also made by the Ben Ali regime. Ben Ali tried to cash in on his visit to Bouazizi in the hospital on December 28th, but it turned against him. He reshuffled his cabinet. Ben Ali also promised to create 30,000 jobs. A day before he stepped down, Ben Ali said that he would not stand for re-elections in 2014 and promised to take major reforms. Even so on the day he stepped down, Ben Ali took some last minute conciliatory measures. He dissolved the parliament, promised to hold elections within six months. But these offers just did not strike a chord with the protestors.

The story in Egypt was similar: resorting to repressions first and then later on to concessions. In order to cut the flow of information, the Mubarak regime shut down internet traffic and mobile services in the country. One of the telecom companies, Vodafone, was forced to send texts to users in support of the regime. Some of the bloggers were also arrested by the security forces. In Egypt, the regime pushed the state into lawlessness: it not only withdrew police but also let loose thugs and criminals on protestors and homes; closed down mobile phones and internet. In response to shutting down of internet and mobile phones, protestors responded by new ways of "communication, self-organization, self-policing, collective security and mutual solidarity."[10] The protestors were united in their goal i.e., ousting the regime.

Mubarak also made attempts to appease the protestors. He relaxed a few rules, showed willingness to talk and also called back police from the streets and employed army instead. The army however refused to carry out regimes' orders. Mubarak also

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[10] Affendi, "Constituting liberty, Healing the Nation: revolutionary identity creation in the Arab World's delayed 1989", *Third World Quarterly*, 2011, Vol: 32, No. 7, 1255-1271, p. 1269.

dissolved the cabinet and dismissed Interior minister. He appointed intelligence chief as Vice President and former Air Force Chief, Ahmed Shafik, as the Prime Minister. On February 10th, Mubarak announced that he would not stand in next elections that were to be held in September that year. Gamal Mubarak also assured that he would not run for presidential campaign in September 2011. The Egyptian regime offered many concessions, but of course they were too little too late. The concessions only strengthened the resolve of the protestors.

International Response

Contradictory to democracy rhetoric of the West, and particularly the United States, the practice had long been to support the authoritarian regimes in the Arab World. The Western policy had shown preference for status quo. They feared that any change in the regime would bring Islamists to power in the Arab World which would jeopardize their alliance and threaten Israel's national interests. The regimes of Ben Ali and Mubarak enjoyed considerable support of the West.

The US watched the protests and demonstrations quietly. The first response from the US came right after Ben Ali had stepped down on January 14th, 2011. President Obama denounced the violence unleashed on Tunisian people and applauded the courage of the people. The change in the US policy came reluctantly. Seeing the success of the people against the regime, the US had no choice but to switch sides. While the US was caught off guard in Tunisia, in Egypt its response came quickly. As the protestors gained strength in Egypt and downfall of Mubarak became apparent, the US saw no choice but to extend support to the Egyptian people. The Egyptian army's favourable role during the revolutions is considered to be shaped by directions of the US.[11]

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[11] Muhammad Ijaz Latif and Hussain Abbas, 'US Democracy Promotion and Popular Revolutions in the Middle East: Challenges and Opportunities', ***Pakistan***

The response from European Union (EU) countries has been similar especially in Tunisian case. Ben Ali regime has always been in good books of the EU, and particularly France; they safeguarded their economic and security interests through Ben Ali's rule. While the EU watched quietly to the protests in Tunisia, France was willing to extend support to Ben Ali even at the height of violence unleashed by the regime. In Egypt, the EU did not ask Mubarak to step down but only made pleas for bringing the violence to an end and undertake reforms.[12]

Thus, the Western response came slow and with much reluctance. The role of major international powers in the revolutionary process was muted and limited at best. It was the growing strength of the people that brought a change in the policy of the West.

Revolutionary Process

Below we will look into all the events in Egypt and Tunisia in the light of theoretical framework put forth by Goldstone. This may cause a repetition of incidents narrated earlier.

Actors

The revolutions revealed altogether new subjectivity.[13] Political activism and dissent did not come from political parties or civil society organizations but from outside the state and traditional elites. Ordinary people reinvented themselves as political subjects through common experience and learning. They were no longer the objects of repression. They were willing to bring a change they desired. The actors did not belong to any specific class. The change was more pluralistic.

Horizon, 2011, Vol: 64, No. 3, 25-42, pp. 31-35.
[12] Sally Khalifa Isaac, 'Europe and the Arab Revolutions', KFG Working Paper no 39, http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/kfgwp/wpseries/WorkingPaperKFG_39.pdf (Access date: September 2012)
[13] Nasser Abourahme and May Jayyusi, "The will to revolt and the Specter of the Real Reflections on the Arab Movement", *City*, 2011, Vol: 16, No. 6, 625-630, p. 626.

The youth with expertise in new communication technologies certainly played a commendable role. They made best use of their technological skills using Facebook and Twitter for political activism. The youth were in the forefront. The women also came out in large numbers in the protests. They were equal citizens demanding for change irrespective of any gender divide.

Even prior to the revolutions, individuals such as ordinary citizens were engaged in anti-regime dissent through personal lifestyles that was in sharp contrast to secular values professed by the regime. There was a 'retreat to private sphere'.[14] This dissent was expressed through adopting pious behaviour in the form of adoption of Arab-Muslim identity. The manifestation was seen through wearing of hijabs, charity works, and rapid increase in number of Quranic associations after 2000s. Earlier in the nationalist or religious aspired movements of the Arab world, the concept of individual was missing. The individual had subordinated to the collectivity – the nation or Islamic Ummah. But this time, the individual came first and he kept his dignity and rights supreme.

The role of Islamist parties or political parties as organized groups was negligible. They acted as individuals and not in capacity of groups or parties. They deliberately kept a low profile and did not disclose their identity thinking people may fear the Islamists; and also due to the fear that the regime would quell the revolution on pretext of being masterminded by the Islamists.

In Egypt, the rigged elections that were held under Mubarak had provided training to many activists particularly those belonging to opposition parties such as Muslim Brotherhood. These members of opposition parties followed the practices that they had used

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[14] Francesco Cavatorta and Rikke Hostrup Haugbolle, "The End of Authoritarian Rule and the Mythology of Ben Ali", *Mediterranean Politics*, 2012, Vol: 17, No. 2, 179-195, pp. 189-190.

earlier against the regime.[15] Yet again, the participation was on individual basis.

Even organized entities such as labour unions did not act as a cohesive force in the beginning. Within the UGTT in Tunisia, there was a division: the top leadership sided with the regime while the intermediate level dealing with primary and secondary education, health and telecommunications sided with the protestors. Thus, at the local level trade union played an important part in giving a thrust to the revolution in the beginning. The central leadership joined towards the end but when it did it proved decisive.[16]

Networks

Two of the oldest dictators were gone in no time. The stunning pace of the revolutions has confounded the analysts and statesmen alike as they fail to comprehend how people connected and coordinated these events. The people were connected through loose networks. This networking was made possible through new technological tools such as internet and social media, mobile phones as well as older media such as satellite television and physical occupation of public squares.

Digital Media

Networks can be virtual and real. In this globalized world, the concept of networks has drastically changed. The digital media has enhanced the number and reach of the participants and has helped "citizens to report news, expose wrong-doing, express opinions, mobilize protest, monitor elections, scrutinize government, deepen participation, and expand the horizons of freedom."[17] The new

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[15] Tarek Masoud, "The Road to (and from) Liberation Square**",** *Journal of Democracy*, 2011, Vol: 22, No. 3, 20-34, p. 24.

[16] Farhad Khosrokhavar, "The New Arab Revolutions that shook the World"*, Paradigm,* Boulder, 2012, p. 39.

[17] Christian Christensen, "Discourses of Technology and Liberation: State Aid to Net Activists in an Era of 'Twitter Revolutions'", *The Communication Review*, 2011,

technologies have facilitated grassroots networks aimed at democratic objectives due to rapid spread of information and communication.

The news and images of self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17th, 2010 spread through blogs and text messages in Tunisia. In matter of no time, an online campaign was organized garnering support for uprising in Sidi Bouzid, the hometown of Bouazizi. The hatred for the regime also spread through tales of corruption posted on YouTube videos. The corrupt practices of the regime in economic sphere exposed through internet revitalized various sections of trade union in Tunisia. The working-class youth already disgruntled with the regime indulged into 'below-the radar' political activities forming loosely structured networks against the regime.[18]

In Egypt, Wael Ghonim, Egypt's Google Executive, had set up a Facebook page on Khaled Said, a blogger killed by the police for reporting corruption. His page provided a platform to thousands of Egyptians who had common problems and shared resentment against the regime. A song uploaded on the YouTube showed images of repression at the hands of the regime. The Egyptian online activists called for protests on January 25th, 2011. Asma Mehfouz, another online activist, through a video log asked the Egyptian youth to take to the streets and protest beside her. The internet users saw a major surge, i.e., 68% increase, prior to and during the protests.[19] Egyptian online activists took tips from their Tunisian counterparts on evading regime surveillance. The regime

Vol: 14 no 3, 233-253, p. 236.
[18] Francesco Cavatorta and Rikke Hostrup Haugbolle, "The End of Authoritarian Rule and the Mythology of Ben Ali", *Mediterranean Politics*, 2012, Vol: 17, No. 2, 179-195, pp. 187.
[19] Genevieve Barrons, "'Suleiman: Mubarak decided to step down #egypt #jan OH MY GOD': examining the use of social media in the 2011 Egyptian revolution", *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 2012, Vol: 5, No. 1, 54-67, p. 58.

cracked down on bloggers and internet activists including Ghonim. However, regimes' repressive measures only strengthened the resolve of Egyptians to protest.

Social media changed the pattern of political dissent and mobilization. People found like-minded people on the internet. This is one of the features of social networking sites; homophile i.e., to connect to like-minded people and associate with people of similar interests and concerns.[20] Digital media proved as 'virtual headquarters' where discussion held and plans made.

After the cracking down of the regime on various Social Networking Sites (SNS), political activists continued their efforts through alternative sources. The word for protest was further spread through mobile phones. The mobile phone usage was much larger than use of social media; as only twenty percent of the population actively used social media. The mobile penetration was 76% in Tunisia and 40% in Egypt.[21]

Explaining in the context of the Arab revolutions, Salwa Ismail explains how individual desperation transformed into collective action. The collectivity was formed of individuals who shared common unpleasant experiences of interaction with the regime, its agencies particularly the police that gave way to shared sentiments of anger towards the government and frustration with the possibility of change in political structure. Through the social networking sites, these individual voices formed a collective voice. They came into contact with each other and exchanged their views and realized they were not alone in having these sentiments towards the regime. They thus thought of ways for bringing a transformation. The individual sentiments helped form a collective will, a collective

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[20] Robert Bodle, "Assessing social network sites as international platforms", *Journal of International Communication*, 2010, Vol: 16, No. 2, 9-24, p. 18.
[21] George Joffe, "The Arab Spring in North Africa: origins and prospects", *The Journal of North African Studies, 2011,* Vol: 16, No. 4, 507-532, p. 532.

vision for change.[22] The social networking sites offering creative political opportunities for autonomous individuals resulted in mass engagement and collaboration.[23]

Old Media

There was a total black out of internet and mobile phones during the most critical days of the protests. But still the protests continued. Other means came handy for spread of information. After shutting down of internet and mobile phones in both Tunisia and Egypt, people moved to televisions.

The story of Bouazizi was telecast on satellite channels and reached far more people than it could through other networks. The people discussed this issue with others in the neighbourhood. The role of Al-Jazeera, a Qatar-based channel stands out among the news channels. It gave around the clock coverage of the events in both English and Arabic. It broadcasted live events from the streets, covering eyewitness accounts of individuals, protests and state repression. Al-Jazeera however did not rely on television broadcast, it also used social media. The new media gradually crossed over into the mainstream media similar to the way individuals got connected to the collectivity.[24]

The reach of new technologies was limited despite the claims made otherwise. Majority of population did not have access to internet; it was largely the domain of educated people. Ramesh Srinivasan explains this point very eloquently: "While networks of social media users may be limited, circumscribed, and actually not directly connected to street action, they still may communicate, or

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[22] Salwa Ismail "Civilities, Subjectivities and Collective Action: preliminary reflections in light of the Egyptian Revolution", **Third World Quarterly**, 2011, Vol: 32, No. 5, 989-995, p. 992.
[23] Natalie Fenton and Veronica Barassi, "Alternative Media and Social Networking Sites: The Politics of Individuation and Political Participation", **The Communication Review**, 2011, Vol: 14, No. 3, 179-196, p. 180.
[24] Fenton and Barassi, ibid., p. 181.

bridge, with other networks that reach and stir people across social classes and geographies… [There was] minimal use and engagement with social media [in Egypt but] many living in garbage-filled shacks had televisions with satellite dishes. If social media networks influence these mass-consumed older media networks, then a story of networks and activism is one of the relationships between these layers within the media ecology of a place."[25]

Hence, mobilization of the people would not have been possible with digital media alone but with the interaction between new and old media. As a journalist put it so aptly that there was an official marriage between new media and mainstream media.[26]

Physical Occupation

By the time Bouazizi died, these political activists have 'moved from virtual to actual public spaces.'[27] The networking would not have been complete without the occupation of public squares by the people. In these revolutions, public space was equally important despite the initial bidding by the media. The street became very important factor in reshaping the structure. It is the place where people gathered, talked, learnt a great deal about each other, mobilized, and struggled for common goal. They all stood together, looked after each other, the wounded and national buildings. Peter Marcuse acknowledges the critical functions of these occupying spaces: an umbrella function bringing together various groups; education; creation of a community of trust and commitment; activation i.e., inspiring others; confrontation; and symbolism, a demand for change.[28]

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[25] Ramesh Srinivasan, "Bridges between Cultural and Digital Worlds in Revolutionary Egypt", *The Information Society: An International Journal*, 2013, Vol: 29, No. 1, 49-60, p. 57.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Howard Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, "The Role of Digital Media", *Journal of Democracy*, 2011, Vol: 22, No. 3, 35-48, pp. 36-38.

[28] Barbara Lipietz and Marcelo Lopes de Souza, 'Introduction: Where do we stand?

The "interactive aspect of collective behaviour" was important. As people gathered, their interaction taught them a great deal through observation of each other's moves.[29] The collective action by the Tunisian and Egyptian people developed without any formally established organizations. Their action was in spur-of-the-moment, not planned. Some of the organizations that had been developed earlier played a negligible part.

Protest Identities

In these Arab revolutions, the people recreated their identity in a unique way through the revolutionary act. The revolutionary process gave them a new shared identity that did not exist earlier.

The protest identity was reinforced when the people occupied physical spaces. In both countries, as noted above, the people looked after each other and shared responsibilities. They distributed food, disposed off waste, nursed each other, looked after their belongings and defended each other against regime's crackdown. The Copts in Egypt also protected Muslims as they prayed. There was a collective desire for disobedience and action. This generated the readiness to sacrifice.

People discovered that they were not alone, but their anti-regime sentiments were shared by thousands of people. They found their neighbours, colleagues, friends on the streets. They all aspired for freedom that has been denied to them for so long. They shared a 'free public space'. Together they chanted slogans and made common demands; defended each other against police and pro-regime thugs. They realized that they did not have to fear each other. The public spirit shown became "the essence of the revolutionary spirit."[30]

New hopes, frustration and open wounds in Arab Cities', *City,* 2012, Vol: 16, No. 3, 355-359, p. 357.
[29] Eberhard Kienle, "Egypt without Mubarak, Tunisia after Bin Ali: theory, history and the 'Arab Spring'", *Economy and Society*, 2012, Vol: 41, No. 4, 532-557, p. 545.
[30] Affendi, "Constituting liberty, Healing the Nation: revolutionary identity

Farhad Khosrokhavar states that once people become part of the protests, then they started losing any inhibitions they had earlier and become active.[31] They were ready to act, to do whatever was possible to rid themselves of the despots, to regain their dignity and to avenge the death of their loved ones. They developed an inter-subjective feeling of being part of something big where their fates are intertwined. This feeling of belonging to a larger group or movement gives a collective identity.

The regimes had prolonged their rule through divisions of the society along various lines; Islamists, non-Islamists, leftists, and conservatives, etc. These differences amongst protestors as Muslims and Christians, liberals and Islamists, rich and poor, men and women ceased to exist. Protestors left behind all those divisions and renounced any identity except that of a protestor.

Culture

The political culture in a society can change through technological innovation, integration and globalization. Modernity is delinked with geography in contemporary times. The citizens of undeveloped regions of the world do not only aspire for development but also dignity. In the context of Tunisia and Egypt the political culture saw a rapid change through digital media connecting the Arab public; the digital technologies reshaped "the spheres of religion, politics and culture."[32]

For decades, the Arab masses were suppressed by the autocrats. After the dawn of new century, the new communication technologies spread very rapidly in the MENA region and became popular. The urban citizens stayed connected with their relatives

creation in the Arab World's delayed 1989", *Third World Quarterly*, 2011, Vol: 32, No. 7, 1255-1271, pp. 1263-1267.
[31] Farhad Khosrokhavar, "The New Arab Revolutions that shook the World"*, Paradigm,* Boulder, 2012, p. 38.
[32] Karim Tartoussieh, "Virtual Citizenship: Islam, culture, and politics in digital age", *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, Vol: 17, No. 2 (March 2011), p. 198.

living abroad through internet and stayed informed through foreign news agencies. A new culture was created; a "culture of freedom" as opposed to the old "culture of servitude".[33] The calls for freedom, democracy and good governance by the people of both countries have been the result of cultural and social changes.

The digital culture in the Arab countries flourished due to a large youthful population. Those aged between 15 and 29 form 75% of the Facebook users in the MENA region; this age group also makes up one-third of the Arab populations.[34]

The cultural globalization is apparent in outlook of the youth, i.e., their taste for international brands and lifestyles. However, the impact of globalization was more pronounced for urban youth than rural. The younger generation in the Arab world connected to the modern world through the communication networks was becoming aware of their rights. The youth compared to their parents had more expectations while their lives under the authoritarian regimes were different. The rulers used the same jargon to legitimize their rule that was given earlier to their parents. This was unacceptable to the younger generation.

Humiliation suffered at the hands of the regime was against the principles of modern citizenship projected through the digital media. Barrie Axford writes that technological changes have overridden the "particular histories, political cultures, and subjectivities".[35]

The globally connected Arab youth still lives with the family sharing many family and societal values. The information accessed by the youth is also shared with family members and other members

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[33] Farhad Khosrokhavar, "The New Arab Revolutions that shook the World", *Paradigm,* Boulder, 2012, p. 1.
[34] Halim Rane & Sumra Salem, "Social media, social movements and the diffusion of ideas in the Arab uprisings", *Journal of International Communication*, 2012, Vol: 18, No. 1, p. 104.
[35] Barrie Axford, "Talk About a Revolution: Social Media and the MENA Uprisings", *Globalizations*, 2011, Vol: 8, No. 5, p. 682.

of the society. The youth, in particular, created 'patchwork identities'; unique identities that is a composition of values drawn from various cultures.[36]

The young generation used ways that were not usually associated with political activism in local culture. A few of these were rap music and cartoons of Leila Trabelsi posted on YouTube. This only validates that political culture has been transformed through technology. "This communicative culture combines local preferences with those borrowed from a global cultural context".[37] Thus, youthful population connected to the global world through internet transformed the culture.

Egyptians have been employing the digital media for political objectives earlier too such as election boycotts and demonstrations. Therefore, they were quite familiar to the digital media. Digital technologies had also been utilized by different groups to express dissent. Muslim Brotherhood had launched a social networking site of its own called *Ikhwanbook*. These 'digital practices' left a lasting impression on politics and culture of these Arab societies.[38]

Ideology

Contrary to theory, the ideology was missing in these revolutions. The revolutions were not part of a well laid-out plan. They were a spontaneous act, a sudden outburst of pent-up anger and frustration built up under decades-long repressive rule.

The revolutions were neither Islamic, nor nationalist as the revolutionaries did not demand for an Islamic state or enforcement of Shariah; or the holistic Arab Nation or Islamic Ummah.

The general perception about Arab people was that they were

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[36] Emma C. Murphy, 'Problematizing Arab Youth: Generational Narratives of Systemic Failure', *Mediterranean Politics*, 2012, Vol: 17, No: 1, p. 12-14.
[37] Murphy, ibid., p.12.
[38] Karim Tartoussieh, "Virtual Citizenship: Islam, culture, and politics in digital age", *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, Vol: 17, No. 2 (March 2011), p. 198-204.

"doomed to be fatalistic losers, that their cultural mindset and political traditions are unsuited to democracy."[39] It was always projected by the West that if Arab people were given the chance they would bring militant Islamist elements into power. However, the revolutions were neither started nor lead by extremists elements. Al-Qaeda that has been imploring the masses to oppose the regimes believed that change could only come through violent means. Al-Qaeda was, however, proved wrong by the Arab people. People rejected Al-Qaeda's ideology and favoured an alternative route for change that was nonviolent in character.

Revolutions were about individuals and individual citizenship; making demands for democracy, elections, justice, good governance and human rights.[40] According to Freedom House annual report for Freedom in the World for 2010, based on surveys, support for democracy was high across the region particularly in Tunisia and in Egypt with as much as 96% people supporting democracy.[41] It is not clear if the revolutions were primarily aimed at democracy but they were certainly anti-authoritarian. The common goal for collective action was opposition to authoritarian rule and ouster of these autocrats. The people chanted 'degage', meaning get out, and 'the people wants to overthrow the regime'.

Yet at the same time, there was socio-economic aspect to the demands. Slogans were raised for bread and water. Repulsed by the ever-growing wealth of the ruling families, people demanded social justice and fair economic policies. They wanted end to repression and exploitation. They craved protection against abuse. The desire

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[39] Anouar Boukharas, "The Arab Revolutions for Dignity", *American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of National committee on American Foreign Policy*, 2011, Vol: 33, No. 2, 61-68, p. 62.
[40] Olivier Roy, "The Transformation of the Arab World", *Journal of Democracy*, 2012, Vol: 23, No. 3, 5-18, p. 5.
[41] Mark Tessler at al., "New Findings on Arab Democracy", *Journal of Democracy*, 2012, Vol: 23, No. 4, p. 90.

for dignity was of paramount importance to the protestors; as Tunisians prefer to call their revolution 'Dignity Revolution'. People demanded better economic, social and political conditions rather change. If there was a common factor amongst the demands of the people, one common denominator, it was change.

Farhad Khosrokhavar sums up these demands. He states that these movements follow three main ideas: the non-confessional nature of society; the self-determination of society sans foreign interference and violence; and dignity of the individual.[42]

Thus there were a number of diffused ideals but no one set ideology. Hence, ideology neither motivated the people nor drove them.

Leadership

Again contradicting Goldstone's exposition, these revolutions were not lead by a leader. This is the most unique feature of the revolutions. It was a leaderless, diffused movement. There was no central leader, no "Tunisian Mandela";[43] no organized leadership that was well-established among the populace to give them a direction. The opposition in Tunisia, the leadership of the Ennahda party were in exile in UK and France. Freedom and Equity, closely affiliated with Ennahda and also persecuted by the regime, was active from the beginning in demonstrations but did not lead or organized them. The Muslim Brotherhood also had no role in organizing the protests in Egypt.[44]

The diffused nature of movement did not need room for a leader to play a part. The people were clear about their goal what they had to do, i.e., get rid of the regime. The marginalization of

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[42] Farhad Khosrokhavar, "The New Arab Revolutions that shook the World", **Paradigm**, Boulder, 2012, p. 3.
[43] Benjamin MacQueen, "The Winter of Arab Discontent", **Global Change, Peace and Security**, 2011, Vol: 23, No. 2, 257-261, p. 257.
[44] Karamatullah K. Ghori, "The Arab Spring in Progress", **Pakistan Horizon,** 2012, Vol: 65, No. 4, pp. 34-35.

people existed at such large scale that when they saw an outlet, they turned out in massive numbers and remained persistent and turned into a "leaderless opposition".[45]

Ramesh Srinivasan explains how this movement was leaderless in context of digital networking. The people were free to make a Facebook page, have a say, and feel empowered. Everybody was a leader in his own way.[46] The social networking sites are open; they give equal opportunity to everybody. There is no hierarchy, no top-down flow of policies. There is horizontal networking among the people. Decisions are made through consensus. It was mainly due to social networking that the movements remained leaderless. No one emerged as the leader of the revolutions. Even the figures of opposition political parties joined the protests as individuals.

Farhad Khosrokhavar believes that these movements are close to "alter globalization" movements that have no unified ideology, no leadership, no hierarchy but have a unique identity that denounces violence.[47]

Conclusion

The purpose of this analysis was to apply the fourth generation of revolutionary theory by Goldstone to study the revolutionary process in Tunisia and in Egypt.

The analysis has shown that fourth generation of revolutionary theory explains a large portion of the revolutionary course in Tunisia and Egypt. Goldstone's assertions on creation and adoption of new revolutionary identities, actors, networking, cross-class coalitions,

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[45] Andrea Teti and Gennaro Gervasio, "The Unbearable Lightness of Authoritarianism: Lessons from the Arab Uprisings", *Mediterranean Politics*, 2011, Vol: 16, No. 2, 321-327, p. 324.

[46] Ramesh Srinivasan, "Bridges between Cultural and Digital Worlds in Revolutionary Egypt", *The Information Society: An International Journal*, 2013, Vol: 29, No: 1, 49-60, p. 56.

[47] Farhad Khosrokhavar, "The New Arab Revolutions that shook the World", *Paradigm*, Boulder, 2012, p. 2.

culture, and regime reaction are reaffirmed by these revolutions. Nevertheless, there are some deviations from the theory as well.

The main actors in the revolutionary process were ordinary citizens, neither the political elites nor the civil societies in these countries. The revolutionary subjects were individuals from different walks of life, of Islamist and secular leanings, of both genders, young and old. These people challenged the status quo. They displayed that the most repressed objects can stand up to the repressive regime. And that most internalized forms of political and social power can be unravelled. There was no specific revolutionary class but a cross-class coalition standing up to the regimes that is in line with Goldstone's theory.

The analysis has revealed that theory compliments these revolutions on the loose networks of the people. There was horizontal networking among the people facilitated by youthful culture and online activism. The networking of the people was further strengthened by the old media such as satellite TV. The connectivity and networking among people further enhanced through face-to-face contact during the protests and occupation of public spaces.

Goldstone is also right in saying that there is no pattern of revolution. Every revolutionary process is unique. The regimes do not know whether to repress the revolutionaries or show concessions. Both regimes adopted repressive and conciliatory measures that did not work.

To fourth generation theorists, ideology and leadership is significant in making of revolutions. However, these revolutions were leaderless. This is the most unique feature of the revolutions. It was a leaderless, disaggregated movement.

Contrary to theory, ideology was missing in these revolutions. The revolutions were not part of a well laid-out plan. They were a spontaneous act, a sudden outburst of pent-up anger and frustration built up under decades-long repressive rule. There was no ideology but diffused ideals. These revolutions are driven by individual

aspirations for democracy and social justice. On role of leadership and ideology in making of revolutionary process, the revolutionary theory needs to be revisited.

ÖZET

2011 yılının başlarında olaylar başlamadan önce Mısır ve Tunus'taki otoriter rejimlerin çok güçlü olduğu düşünülmekteydi. Tunus ve Mısır'daki olaylar tahmin edilebilir değildi. Süreç yeni bir akım ile sosyal medyanın imkânları kullanılarak alanlara taşınmış ve geniş ölçekli protesto gösterilerine dönüşmüştü. Bu çalışmada sadece devrimin oluş süreci irdelenmiştir; nedenleri ve sonuçları bu çalışmanın konusu dışındadır. Makale üç bölüme ayrılmaktadır. Birinci bölümde devrimsel sürece ilişkin Goldstone'un kuramı; ikinci bölümde devrime giden yolda meydana gelen olaylar ve üçüncü bölümde ise Goldstone'un devrim kuramı ışığında olayların analizi yer almaktadır.

Devrimci kuramcılar arasında dördüncü kuşakta yer alan Goldstone'a göre birçok sınıfın bir arada yer aldığı koalisyonlar İran, Nikaragua ve Filipinler'deki rejimlerin devrilmesinde önemli bir aktördü. Doğu Avrupa devletleri ve Sovyetler Birliği'ndeki kitlesel eylemler ve grevler devrim sürecinin öncülleriydi. Yapısal paradigma ise bu devrimleri açıklamada yetersiz kalmıştır.

Dördüncü kuşak kuramcılar daha öncekilerin göz ardı ettiği devrim süreci üzerinde durmuşlardır. Onlar, devrimlerin sosyolojisini açıklamak için var olan kuramlara bu yeni kavramların entegre edilmesini vurgulamışlardır. Goldstone'a göre devrim sürecine birçok aktör katılmaktadır.

Devrime giden süreçte her vaka farklı bir karakter sergilemektedir. Örneğin Tunus'ta olayları tetikleyen süreç Mohamed Bouazizi adlı vatandaşın kendini yakmasıyla başlamıştır. Tunus'ta devam eden olaylar Mısır'ı da etkilemiştir. Mısır'daki olayların büyümesine tetikleyen etmenler ise Khaled Said'in güvenlik güçlerince öldürülmesi ve Wikileaks belgelerinin açıklanması olmuştur.

Philip N. Howard ve Muzammil M. Hussain dijital devrimi

beş aşamaya ayırmaktadır. Bunlar; aktivistlerin birbirleriyle dijital medya üzerinden iletişim kurdukları "Hazırlık Aşaması", aktivistlerin tepkisine neden olan bir olayın yaşandığı "Ateşleme Aşaması" ve ardından başlayan "Sokak Protestoları" ile uluslararası kamuoyunun (medya, hükümetler ve uluslararası kurumlar vs.) dikkatini çeken protesto görüntülerinin "Uluslararası Alanda Fark Edilmesi Aşaması" ve son olarak da olayların tırmandığı "Zirve Aşaması"dır. Son aşamada hükümetler protestoları taviz vererek ya da baskı altına alarak sonlandırmaya çalışmaktadır ve bu durum her ülkenin kendi iç dinamikleri neticesinde farklı sonuçlar doğurmaktadır.

Bu olguyu açıklayan diğer bir kavram da "bulaşma etkisi"dir. Olaylar salgın bir hastalık gibi yayılmaktadır. Devrime giden sürecin ilk aşamalarında öğrenme daha çok bilgi kanalları vasıtasıyla gerçekleşmektedir. Ancak daha sonra bulaşma etkisi bilişsel ve bilinçli bir şekilde değil daha çok duyguların ve kulaktan kulağa yayılan bilgilerin rol aldığı bir süreçte yayılmaktadır. Bu durum insanları protestolara katılmaya ve ortak bir kimliğe sahip çıkmaya teşvik eder. Bu nedenle Mısır ve Tunus'taki olaylar insanları sokaklara ve meydanlara çıkmaya itmiştir. Tahrir Meydanı'ndaki insanların görüntüsü diğer insanlar üzerinde bir motivasyon oluşturmuştur.

İktidarlar protestolara karşı baskıcı önlemler uygulamaya çalışmıştır. Tunus'ta insanlar tutuklanmış, öldürülmüş ve internete sansür uygulanmıştır. Protestolar arttıktan sonra ise Ben Ali rejiminin reform hareketleri bir karşılık bulmamış ve Ben Ali istifa etmek durumunda kalmıştır. Süreç Mısır'da da benzer şekilde işlemiştir. Baskı, şiddet ve internet yasaklarının ardından iktidar kanadından tavizler gelmeye başlamış, Mübarek polisi sokaklardan çekerek orduyu görevlendirmiş ancak ordu rejimin emirlerini uygulamayı reddetmiştir. Mübarek'in kabinede yaptığı değişikler veya bir sonraki seçimlerde aday olmayacağını açıklaması da halk nezdinde karşılık bulamamıştır.

Olaya uluslararası kamuoyunun penceresinden bakıldığında görülen şudur: Batı dünyasının özellikle de ABD'nin demokrasi vurgusuna rağmen pratikte Arap Dünyası'ndaki otoriter rejimleri desteklediği görülmektedir. Batı dünyası statükodan yana tavır

almış ve herhangi bir rejim değişikliğinin İslamcı grupları iktidara taşıyarak aralarındaki müttefikliği ve İsrail'in ulusal çıkarlarını zarara uğratacağını düşünmüştür. Olaylara ABD tarafından gelen ilk tepki Ben Ali'nin istifasından sonradır. Avrupa Birliği'nin sergilediği tutumlar da benzerdir.

Olayların gelişim sürecine bakıldığınca süreçte rol alanların siyasi partilerden veya toplumsal örgütlerden bağımsız halk kitleleri olduğu görülmektedir. Özellikle gençlerin sosyal medya kullanımı da süreçte etkin rol oynamıştır. Protestolarda dikkat çeken bir diğer unsur da kadınların sayıca fazlalığıdır. Sürecin İslamcı gruplar tarafından yönetildiği algısı yaratmamak için de bu gruplar protestolara örgütsel olarak değil bireysel olarak katılmıştır.

Devrime giden süreçte kullanılan en etkin araçlardan birisi de sosyal medya ve internettir. Video paylaşım sitelerine yüklenen videolar, sosyal paylaşım sitelerinde yapılan paylaşımlar neticesinde insanlar sosyal medya üzerinden örgütlenmişlerdir. Protestoların en yoğun olduğu günlerde ise internete karartma uygulanmıştır. İnternetin ve cep telefonların kullanılamamasın ardından ise Tunus ve Mısır'da insanlar televizyonlara yönelmiştir. Yaşananların televizyon ekranlarında gösterilmesi olayların geniş halk kesimleri arasında bilinir olmasını sağlamıştır. Sosyal medyada örgütlenen insanların sokağa ve meydanlara çıkması bu süreci şekillendiren diğer bir önemli etmen olmuştur. İnsanlar meydanlarda toplanmış, konuşmuş, birbirlerini tanımış ve ortak bir amaç için mücadele etmiştir.

Arap dünyası on yıllardır otokrat olarak tabir edilebilecek yöneticiler tarafından baskı altında tutulmaktaydı. Yeni yüzyılla birlikte iletişim teknolojilerinin yaygınlaşmasıyla insanlar dış dünyadan daha çok haberdar olmaya başladılar ve "kölelik kültürü"nün yerini "özgürlük kültürü" aldı. Bunun en önemli etkenlerinden biri de Arap ülkelerindeki genç nüfusun sayıca fazla olmasıdır. Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika Bölgesi'nde 15 ila 29 yaş arasındaki gençlerin %75'i Facebook kullanıcısıdır. Bu gençlerin yöneticilerden beklentileri anne ve babalarının beklentilerinden farklı olmaktadır.

Mısır ve Tunus'ta yaşanan süreçlerinin ideolojik yanının eksik olduğu da söylenebilir. Sokağa çıkan ve taleplerini ifade eden insanların talepleri demokratik yönetim, adalet ve insan haklarıydı. Bu sürecin bir lideri de bulunmamaktaydı. Ramesh Srinivasan'a göre bunun nedeni sosyal medya araçları olmuştur. Çünkü burada herkes birer lider durumundaydı ve bilindik hiyerarşik düzenler geçerli olmamaktaydı. Kararlar hep birlikte alınmaktaydı. Bu nedenle süreçte herhangi bir lider ön plana çıkmamıştır. Muhalefet partilerinin liderleri dâhi sürece bireysel olarak katılmışlardı.

Sonuç olarak, bu çalışmasının amacı, Goldstone'un dördüncü kuşak devrimci kuramını Tunus ve Mısır'daki süreç bağlamında değerlendirmektir. Goldstone'un kuramına dayanak teşkil eden unsuları Tunus ve Mısır'ın geçirdiği süreçlerde görmek mümkündür. Bunun yanı sıra kuramdan bazı sapmalar da mevcuttur. Devrim sürecinde rol alanlar siyasi elitler veya sivil toplum örgütleri değil sıradan vatandaşlardır. Bu harekete İslamcı ya seküler eğilimleri olan genç yaşlı veya kadın-erkek toplumun tüm kesimlerinden insanlar katılmıştır. Bu süreçte devrimi gerçekleştiren belirli bir sınıf hareketi değildir. Goldstone'un kuramı doğrultusunda karma bir koalisyonun rejim karşısında direnmesi söz konusudur. Dördüncü kuşak kuramcılar için devrimlerin en önemli unsurları ideoloji ve liderdir. Ancak bu devrimlerin en önemli ve ayırt edici özelliği ise lidersiz bir hareket olmasıdır. Aynı şekilde bunların ideolojik bir çerçevede cereyan ettiği de söylenemez. Bu hareketler daha çok kendiliğinden gelişen ve uzun yıllar sürmüş baskı rejimlerine bir tepki olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu hareketlerde ideolojiden çok bireylerin demokrasi ve sosyal adalet talepleri ön plana çıkmıştır.

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